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NOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-
Desecration of National Symbols As Protected 
Political Expression 
Protest groups have long recognized the publicity value of engag-
ing in dramatic kinds of symbolic behavior to express their disap-
proval of government policy, and recently they have resorted to the 
desecration of traditionally "sacred" symbols to achieve this end. 
Recourse to conduct offensive to the patriotic and religious sensi-
bilities of large segments of the population seems to have paralleled 
the advent of widespread civil disobedience as an instrument of 
political persuasion. Specifically, dissent over the Vietnam war has 
produced a number of incidents involving public disrespect for the 
American flag.1 Thus, a need has arisen to analyze the extent to 
which the first amendment protects this particular form of expression. 
Two recent New York cases present the relevant issues in sharp 
perspective. In People v. Radich,2 the defendant publicly exhibited 
certain articles of "protest art" which incorporated cherished politi-
cal and religious symbols into graphic portrayals of political themes. 
Among the "constructions" which the defendant displayed were an 
American flag stuffed and shaped to suggest the figure of a human 
body hanging from a noose and a phallic symbol wrapped in a flag 
and protruding from a cross.3 According to testimony taken at the 
trial, the purpose of the exhibit was to protest symbolically "church-
condoned American aggressive warfare in Vietnam."4 The Criminal 
Court of the City of New York found the defendant guilty11 of vio-
lating a New York statute making it a misdemeanor to "publicly 
mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt 
upon either by words or act'' the American flag. 6 The court held 
I. For a general discussion of the free-speech aspects of the Vietnam protest move-
ment in the United States, see Finman & Macaulay, Freedom To Dissent: The Vietnam 
Protests and the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 632. For examples of 
desecration of the American flag, see N.Y. Times, March 24, 1967, at 25, col. l; id., April 
15, 1967, at 36, col. 4: id., April 16, 1967, at 1, col. 3; id., April 19, 1967, at 3, col. 4; id., 
April 20, 1967, at 23, col. 8; id., May 13, 1967, at 17, col. 2. 
2. 53 Misc. 2d 717, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967). 
3. For publicity that surrounded the case, see generally, LIFE, March 31, 1967, at 
18; N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1966, at 2, col. 2: id., May 21, 1967, § 2, at 33-35. 
4. 53 Misc. 2d at 719, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 683. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Basel, 53 Misc. 2d at 723, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 687: 
Defendant contends artist is not showing contempt for the flag. He supports 
what it symbolizes, liberty, equality, freedom, but he protests by means of these 
"constructions" that those virtues have been abandoned by United States conduct 
in Vietnam. The ideals the flag represents, he argues, are enchained, its inspi-
ration publicly hangs in shame before the world, and the church and State are 
jointly to be charged as violators of the innocent. 
5. The penalty inflicted by the three-judge panel, one judge dissenting, was a 
$500 fine or sixty days in jail. 
6. N.Y. PENAL I.Aw § 1425(16)(d) (McKinney 1944). The statute also forbids the use 
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that defendant's constructions constituted contemptuous use of the 
flag and that his conduct was not protected by the first amendment.7 
In the second case, People v. Street,8 the defendant burned an 
American flag on a New York street comer to protest the shooting 
of civil rights leader James Meredith in Mississippi. The defendant 
told a small group of onlookers that "if they let that happen to 
Meredith we don't need an American flag."9 Noting that "insults 
to a flag have been the cause of war,"10 the New York Court of 
Appeals affirmed his conviction under the same flag desecration 
statute applied in Radich.11 
The initial question in analyzing these cases is whether the first 
of the flag for commercial or advertising purposes. All fifty states currently have simi-
lar enactments. See also 9B UNIFORM LAws .ANNOTATED 51-54 (1966). 
7. It is unclear whether the court meant that use of the flag in works of protest 
art is a form of expression not protected by the first amendment or that although 
such conduct is within the amendment's scope, it is subject to regulation under the 
given circumstances. The opinion contains language to the effect that freedom of 
speech docs not include "a license to desecrate the flag." 53 Misc. 2d at 720, 279 
N.Y.S.2d at 684. But the court also stated that there is a sufficient countervailing 
interest in maintaining public order to justify any indirect restraint on expression, 
and that the state may exercise its police power to restrict acts which pose an "'im-
mediate threat to public safety, peace, or order.'" 53 Misc. 2d at 720, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 
684 [quoting from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)]; accord, People v. 
Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967), appeal filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 
3162 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1967) (No. 688). 
In the companion civil case, United States Flag Foundation, Inc. v. Radich, 53 
Misc. 2d 597, 279 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. 1967), plaintiff founded its cause of action 
on the New York flag desecration statute, supra note 6. Recovery was granted; the 
court summarily rejecting defendant's first amendment defense. 
8. 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967), appeal filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 
3162 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1967) (No. 688). A decision in this case is expected before the publi• 
cation date of this Note.-Ed. 
9. 20 N.Y.2d at 234, 229 N.E.2d at 189, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 491. 
10. 20 N.Y.2d at 236, 229 N.E.2d at 190, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 495 [quoting from Halter v. 
Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41 (1907)]. 
11. For other state and lower federal court decisions concerning flag desecration 
statutes, see Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 177, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967) (conviction affirmed 
for contemptuously tearing flag in midst of civil-rights rally); State v. Kent, Hawaii 
1st Cir. Ct., No. 36,423, Dec. 9, 1966 (conviction for contemptuous use of the flag 
reversed); People v. Von Rosen, 13 Ill. 2d 68, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958) (use of flag in 
advertising); State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339, 25 A.2d 491 (1942) (contempt for flag by 
words only); State v. Schlueter, 127 N.J. 496, 23 A.2d 249 (1941) (defendant convicted 
for crumpling flag and tossing it to ground); People v. Picking, 288 N.Y. 644, 42 N.E.2d 
741, 33 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 632 (1942) (use of flag in advertising); 
Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145 (D. Mont. 1920) (ten- to twenty-year sentence imposed for 
abusive words toward flag); People ex rel. McPike v. Van de Carr, 178 N.Y. 425, 70 
N.E. 965, 86 N.Y.S. 644 (1904) (certain portions of flag desecration statute excised on 
constitutional grounds). 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has never considered the validity of using a state 
flag desecration statute to punish this type of political protest. In an early decision 
the Court upheld a state•s prohibition on the exploitation of the flag for commercial 
purposes. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907). There is, however, an obvious dis-
tinction between the protection the Constitution accords commercial advertising and 
that given to political protest. Compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 
(1951) and Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), with New York Times v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and text accompanying notes 20-23 infra. Moreover, the 
Halter case, supra, was disposed of without mention of any first amendment issues. 
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amendment is at all applicable to protect expressions of this type. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that not every communication 
qualifies for protection under the free-speech guaranty. Yet, with 
regard to the form which expression takes, the Court has consis-
tently acknowledged that, as used in the first amendment, the term 
"speech" encompasses activities other than conventional verbal 
communication. Thus, the Court reversed on first amendment 
grounds a Communist youth leader's conviction under a California 
statute prohibiting the display of a red flag, the implicit assumption 
being that the exhibition of the red flag as a form of symbolic pro-
test constituted "speech."12 Similarly, the Court recognized a flag 
salute ceremony as a "form of utterance" when it declared a state 
statute requiring school children to participate in such a ceremony 
to be an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and 
religion.13 More recently, a sit-in demonstration was deemed to be 
a form of speech.14 Therefore, the forms of communication em-
ployed by the defendants in Radich and Street should not preclude 
application of the free speech guaranty. 
The Court has indicated that the content of particular expres-
sions may render the free speech guaranty inapplicable in a limited 
number of cases. Expressions may not claim first amendment pro-
12. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
13. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) [overruling 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)]. The Court recognized that 
"speech" may include "symbolic" expression: 
There is no doubt that • . • the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is 
a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or 
flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from 
mind to mind. 
319 U.S. at 632-33. 
14. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring): 
We would surely have to be blind not to recognize that petitioners were sitting 
at these counters, where they knew they would not be served, in order to demon-
strate that their race was being segregated in dining facilities in this part of the 
country. 
This characterization of sit-ins was accepted by the opinion of Fortas, J., joined by 
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 
(1966) ("stand-in" at public library). 
For other forms of communication which have been regarded as forms of expres-
sion within the scope of the first amendment, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
428-31 (1963) (litigation as a form of free speech): NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 
460-63 (1958) (close connection between freedom of association and freedom of speech); 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures as free speech); 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (labor picketing as free speech). See generally 
Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 CoLuM. L. R:£v. 81, 91-93 
(1964). 
Courts have also assumed that draft-card burning can be a form of symbolic ex-
pression. Compare O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. 
granted, 389 U.S. 814 (1967) (No. 232), with United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72, 79 
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967). See also People v. Stover, 12 N.Y .2d 462, 
469, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963), 
where the court assumed that hanging offensive articles on a clothesline to protest 
high taxes was a form of symbolic expression. 
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tections if they are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed"15 
by the public interest in limiting their dissemination.16 Expressions 
15. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
16. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The notions of "weighing" and "ad hoc balancing" are used 
by courts in different contexts and these terms should be, but often are not, distin-
guished. As used in the text, the term "weigh" refers to the process by which certain 
types of expression, because of their content, are defined as being either within or 
beyond the protection of the first amendment. While this process involves the balanc-
ing of competing public and private interests, once it is complete a settled line emerges 
between protected and unprotected expression. Thus, whatever is defined as falling 
within the scope of the first amendment thereafter remains so. Similarly, those forms 
of expression, such as "fighting words," which are outside the scope of the first amend-
ment remain outside in every subsequent case in which the disputed expression is 
deemed to be within the excluded category. 
Judicial weighing of interests has also been used in cases involving the regulation 
of conduct. Although neutral in terms of the content of the expression, this type of 
balancing is aimed at restricting methods of expression which would otherwise be 
available. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939), with American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also the following expression of 
the doctrine in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961): 
[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but 
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type 
of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, 
when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental inter-
ests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing 
of the governmental interest involved. 
Finally, "ad hoc balancing'' has recently come to the fore, primarily in cases in-
volving compelled disclosure of membership lists. Some commentators have suggested 
that this "balancing test" is being utilized to justify direct restrictions on the content 
of speech. See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1428-
29 (1962). For cases in which the "ad hoc balancing test" has been applied, see 
Aptheker v. Secretary, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia 
ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Com., 372 
U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Communist Party v. Subversive 
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961): In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); 
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Dennis 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For comments 
generally supporting the "ad hoc balancing test," see "\V. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK 
AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961); Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitu-
tional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 75; Kauper, Book Review, 58 MICH. L. REV. 619 
(1960); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Bal-
ance, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 821 (1962). For comments generally opposed to the test, see 
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra, at 164 (Black, J., dissent-
ing); In re Anastaplo, supra, at 110 (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 
supra, at 141 (Black, J., dissenting); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT, 53-56 (1966) reprinted from 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963): Bendich, The Civil 
Rights Revolution and the First Amendment-"The Reds and the Blacks," 2 LAw 
COMMENTARY 33 (1964); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1962); Cahn, 
Mr. Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 
N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 (1962); Frantz, The First Amendment in Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 
(1962) [followed by Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes 
in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law!-A 
Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1963); and Mendelson, The First 
Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 
(1964)]; Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 
CALIF. L. REv. 4 (1961). For a general consideration of the compelled disclosure cases, 
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included in this category are the lewd and obscene,17 the defama-
tory,18 and "fighting words."19 However, the essence of the free 
speech guaranty is that political protest, precisely because of its 
content, is so intrinsically valuable as a stimulant to free thought 
and discussion that it can never be wholly excluded from the pro-
tection of the first amendment on the basis of minimal social im-
portance.20 This was recently exemplified by the Court's holding in 
see Bendich, First Amendment Standards for Congressional Investigation, 51 CALIF. L. 
R.Ev. 311 (1963). 
17. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Compare the Court's refusal 
to distinguish between socially useful and nonuseful ideas in Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Although in Roth the test of obscenity was "whether to the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest,'' in later cases only "hard-
core pornography" was likely to be condemned, since a further requirement that the 
material be "utterly without redeeming ~ocial importance" was added to the obscenity 
test. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Mishkin v. New York, 383 
U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); A Book Named "John 
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of PJeasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964)/ Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 
(1962); Kingsley lnt'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). Although of ques-
tionable merit, the suggestion might be made that the phallic-symbol "construction" 
in the Radich case is "hard-core pornography" within the Supreme Court's test, and 
therefore should be completely outside the protection of the first amendment. Compare 
Justice Stewart's dissent to the denial of certiorari in Fort v. Miami, 389 U.S. 918 
(1967). See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 89-91 (1966), reprinted from 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Cairns, Paul, &: Wishner, 
Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 
46 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1009 (1962); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 
SuP. CT. REv. l; Lockhart &: McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Constitutional Issue 
-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289 (1961); Lockhart &: McClure, Censorship of 
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standard, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5 (1960); A. Meikle-
john, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. R.Ev. 245, 262. 
18. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952): 
Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, 
it is unnecessary .•• to consider the issues behind the phrase "clear and present 
danger." Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may 
be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel ••. is in the same 
class. 
It might be argued, relying on Beauharnais, that the defendant in Radich defamed 
the "church" as an institution by the insinuation in his "constructions" that churches 
condone war. However, it should be noted that it is questionable today whether the 
"devoid of social value" approach still has validity in the Beauharnais context. The 
literature at issue there was part of an effort by a group of dissidents to engender 
support for legislative action on a question of wide public interest and importance. It 
was therefore political in nature and its condemnation by the Court would seem to 
have encroached upon precisely what the first amendment is designed to protect. See, 
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 
1 (1949). 
19. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940) ("Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper 
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and 
its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument,"). 
But cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 
4 (1949). On the "fighting words" doctrine generally, see Wade, Tort Liability for 
Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. R.Ev. 63, 102-10 (1950). 
20. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 270 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); 
A. ME!KLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT 25-27 (1948); 
A. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245. 
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New York Times v. Sullivan,21 that even libelous utterances, which 
have traditionally been excluded from the safeguards of the first 
amendment,22 may be protected if they are expressions "of grievance 
and protest on one of the major public issues of our times."23 
Radich and Street both seem to have involved this type of intrin-
sically valuable political protest. In Street, it was apparent that de-
fendant's flag burning was incident to a political commentary on 
racial injustice since he verbally stated his purpose prior to acting. 
Any question as to whether the defendant in Radich was engaged in 
expressing a political grievance on a vital public issue would seem 
to be precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in Bond v. Floyd24 
that the refusal of the Georgia House of Representatives to seat a 
newly-elected Negro because of his avowed support for American 
Negroes refusing to serve in Vietnam constituted a denial of his 
right of free speech. If statements that the principles which the 
American flag symbolizes are being compromised by government 
policy in Vietnam were protected political expressions, conveying the 
same idea graphically should also be within the scope of the free 
speech guaranty.25 Thus, to say that the expressions in the tw-o 
principal cases are "devoid of social value" would be contrary to the 
very purpose of the first amendment.26 
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
22. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State :Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49, n.10 (1961); Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); :Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); 
Pennckamp v. Florida, 325 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 572 (1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931); T. EMERSON, supra note 
17, at 68-69. 
23. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964); accord, Rosenblatt v. 
Daer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) ("The thrust of New York Times is that when interests in 
public discussion are particularly strong, as they were in that case, the Constitution 
limits the protections afforded by the law of defamation."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); cf. Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. :Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). For general literature in the area, see also :Berney, 
Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1 
(1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the 
First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 191, 204-05, 213-19; A. Meiklejohn, The First 
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 259; D. Meiklejohn, Public 
Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234, 238-39 (1966); Pedrick, Freedom 
of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL 
L.Q. 581, 601-08 (1964). 
24. 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
25. Judge :Basel, dissenting in People v. Radich, 53 Misc. 2d 717, 724, 279 N.Y.S.2d 
680, 688 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967), referred to the 100,000 people who marched on the 
United Nations in protest against American Vietnam policy, and such notable public 
figures as Senators Fulbright, Hatfield, and Morse, each of whom has expressed oppo-
sition to the war in Vietnam. "No one would seriously argue they be jailed for ex-
pressing verbally or in writing what the artist here makes visual." 
26. Justice :Black has frequently expressed the fear that while obscenity or "fighting 
words" may be proscribed today under the "devoid of social value" test, the experience 
of mankind indicates that this type of elastic exception to first amendment freedoms 
can, and probably will, be expanded to include political or religious unorthodoxy to-
morrow. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (Black, J., concurring). See also 
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However, the fact that these expressions of protest are protectible 
under the first amendment does not complete the analysis.27 The 
first amendment does not confer an unlimited license to communi-
cate.28 An individual's right to express his views must be reconciled 
with the public's interest in tranquility and security. If an exercise 
of the right presents a sufficient threat to that interest, the state is 
justified in imposing reasonable restrictions upon the expression in 
order to protect the public welfare.29 It is, therefore, necessary to 
determine whether the interest of the State of New York was suf-
ficient to make permissible the regulation of the expressions of 
Radich and Street. 
Whether a particular state-imposed restriction is reasonable de-
pends of course on the facts of each case. However, the Supreme 
Court seems to look to certain factors as guidelines in determining 
the degree of protection to be accorded any expression within the 
scope of the first amendment. 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509-13 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by 
Black, J.); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960). 
27. It is significant that the Supreme Court has often based its analysis of cases 
involving symbolic expressions of protest on a perceived dichotomy between "speech" 
and "speech mixed with conduct." Thus, the Court has emphasized that the first 
amendment does not "afford the same kind of freedom to those who would commu-
nicate ideas by conduct" as to "those who communicate ideas by pure speech." Cox. 
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). It has usually been relatively easy for the Court 
to label a given expression as "pure speech" or "speech mixed with conduct." Thus, 
such "pure form[s] of expression" as newspaper commentary, a telegram to a public 
official, or an address delivered from a soapbox are readily distinguishable from a pro-
test march, picketing, or a sit-in demonstration to convey the same idea. However, the 
situation presented in Radich, as well as in some other cases involving expression by 
means of symbols [see People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 
734 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963)], is unique, since the disputed expres-
sion neither utilizes "vocal sounds" or printed words, nor does it employ "physical 
movements" to communicate its idea. This is because a well understood symbol em-
bodies within itself sufficient meaning to communicate an idea passively by its very 
existence. 
28. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966). See also Cox. v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939). 
29. Thus, the state may exercise its police power to regulate conduct which threat-
ens community order, and the fact that such regulation has an adverse indirect effect 
on expression, otherwise permissible, does not necessarily invalidate the state's action 
provided that alternative channels of communication remain open. See, e.g., Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 
(1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffen, 303 U.S. 
444, 451 (1938). See also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (Black, J., writing the 
majority opinion); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-42 (Black, J., dissent-
ing and indicating agreement with these cases). 
When reasonable regulation of conduct is likely to have an indirect effect on the 
expression of ideas, the Court will "weigh" the community interest involved against 
the individual's freedom of speech to insure that the regulation is neutral in its im-
pact on varying points of view, does not impose a licensing scheme, and leaves open 
reasonably adequate alternative means of reaching the public with all points of view. 
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965). See also discussion of judicial 
"weighing" in note 16 supra. 
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One factor is whether the expression will engender a violent 
reaction which will threaten the peace of the community. The 
Court's most explicit statement of the import of this factor came in 
Feiner v. New York,30 in which a speaker had attempted to provoke 
a group of Negroes to take violent action against white people. In 
affirming the speaker's breach of the peace conviction, the Court 
made it clear that he "was neither arrested nor convicted for the 
making or the content of his speech. Rather it was the reaction 
which it actually engendered."31 Therefore, even if the content of 
an expression is protectible under the first amendment, communi-
cation of that content may entail sufficient arousal potential to jus-
tify regulation.32 
Nevertheless, the arousal potential factor must be weighed very 
carefully since effective political comment necessarily provokes strong 
30. 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Note, Municipal Regulation of Free Speech in the Streets 
and Parks, 46 ILL. L. R.Ev. 489 (1951); Comment, Constitutional Law-Municipal Control 
of Public Streets and Parks As Affecting Freedom of Speech and Assembly, 49 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 1185 (1951). Compare Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) and Terminiello 
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949). 
31. 340 U.S. at 319-20. 
32, Another form of communication considered high in arousal potential is the 
motion picture. Although films have been accorded the protections of the free speech 
guaranty Uoseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952)], the Supreme Court has 
adopted the position that "capacity for evil • . • may be relevant in determining the 
permissible scope of community control," and that films arc not "necessarily subject 
to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression." Id. at 502-
03. See generally, Nimmer, The Constitutionality of Official Censorship of Motion Pic-
tures, 25 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 625 (1958); Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Freedom 
of Expression-Motion Picture Censorship, 52 MICH, L. R.Ev. 599 (1954). Presumably 
this independent "capacity for evil" is a function of the motion picture's alleged 
ability to arouse a heightened emotional response. See Note, Motion Pictures and the 
First Amendment, 60 YALE L.J. 696, 704-08 (1951) (communications studies on the ef-
fectiveness of motion pictures as a medium of expression) and sources cited therein. 
Belief in the greater ability of motion pictures to arouse emotions may explain why 
prior submission of films to a censor in advance of exhibition is permitted [Times 
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 
(1965)], although a similar requirement for printed matter would be unconstitutional 
[Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)]. The same may also account for the view 
that certain sexual acts which can be described vividly in books perhaps cannot be 
displayed graphically on the screen. 
See Trans-Lux Dist. Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 92-93, 248 N.Y.S.2d 
857,860 (1964), rev'd mem. 380 U.S. 259 (1965) [on the basis of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
U.S. 51 (1965)]: 
It is my view that a filmed presentation of sexual intercourse, whether real or 
simulated, is just as subject to State prohibition as similar conduct if engaged in 
on the street. I believe the nature of films is sufficiently different from books to 
justify the conclusion that the critical difference between advocacy and actual per-
formance of the forbidden act is reached when simulated sexual intercourse is 
portrayed on the screen. 
This view, however, seems to ignore the fact that a motion picture is sheltered from 
the view of all but those who seek admittance. Since a person who voluntarily enters 
a movie theater ordinarily does so with some expectation of what he will see, the same 
conduct that would be potentially obtrusive when observed in public might not be as 
startling when viewed in the context of the movie. Hence, it does not follow that the 
degree of arousal potential would be the same. 
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reactions. The Supreme Court has stated that "a function of free 
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may 
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even 
stirs people to anger."33 Therefore, focusing solely on the arousal 
potential of an otherwise protected expression as the justification 
for imposing restrictions could frustrate the purpose of the first 
amendment.34 Recognizing this difficulty, the Court has indicated 
that a high degree of arousal potential justifies restricting expression 
only if there are no other means available for maintaining peace 
in the community.35 I£ the state can preserve order by controlling 
the response, thereby permitting communication of the idea rather 
than suppressing it, it has a duty to do so. 
The cases of Cox v. Louisiana36 and Edwards v. South Carolina31 
are illustrative of this principle. In Cox, a group of 2,000 civil-rights 
demonstrators conducted a protest march to the Baton Rouge, Lou-
isiana, courthouse, where they sang hymns and listened to a civil-
rights speech. In response to the "muttering and grumbling" of on-
looking whites, the police dispersed the group and arrested its leader, 
charging him with breach of the peace. The Court held that this 
interference with the expression of a political grievance constituted 
33. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949). For a more current statement of 
this view, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), where the Court 
declared that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 
and that it may include "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp" crit-
icism (emphasis added). 
34. It might be argued that desecration of the flag is not essential to the voicing 
of political protest and that therefore the state should be permitted to minimize the 
arousal potential inherent in that form of expression by requiring the speaker to com-
municate his views in· a more orthodox manner. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 
(1949). But see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting): 
The right to petition for redress of grievances • • . is not limited to writing a 
letter or sending a telegram to a Congressman; it is not confined to appearing 
before the local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or 
Mayor. • . • Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, 
shut off to large groups of our citizens. Legislators may tum deaf ears; formal 
complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; courts may let 
the wheels of justice grind very slowly. Those who do not control television and 
radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspaper or circulate elaborate 
pamphlets may have only a more limited type of access to public officials. Their 
methods should not be condemned as tactics of obstruction and harassment as 
long as the assembly and petition are peaceable • • • . 
It may also be true that "symbolic" expression which cuts through the current mass 
of propaganda competing for the public's attention is the most effective medium 
through which an artist can "invite dispute" on important public issues. See generally, 
T. EMERSON&: D. HABER, PoLmCAL AND CIVIL RIGI-ITS IN THE UNITED STATES 964-71 (2d 
ed. 1958) (collection of communication studies); Rose, The Study of the Influence of 
the Mass Media on Public Opinion, 15 KYKLos 465 (1962) (brief summary of psycho-
logical research methods and findings in the field of public opinion formation). 
35. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229 (1963). See also text accompanying note 39 infra. 
36. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
37. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
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a violation of the right of free speech, since there was no evidence 
that violence was actually threatened by the demonstrators or the 
onlookers, and since sufficient police were available to control any 
disturbance ·which might have occurred. In Edwards, the Court re-
versed a breach of the peace conviction38 based on conduct similar 
to that involved in Cox because the protesters had been "convicted 
upon evidence which showed no more than that the opinions which 
they were peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the view 
of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate 
police protection."39 
On the other hand, in Feiner4-0 the Court was concerned with 
the apparent inability of local authorities to control the situation 
created by the defendant's speech. Only two policemen were avail-
able to deal with a large crowd which had overflowed into the street 
and was "pushing, shoving and milling around,"41 and at least 
one onlooker had threatened violence if the police did not act.42 
Given these circumstances, the Court found that imposing restric-
tions on the inflammatory expression was justifiable.43 
38. But see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
39. 372 U.S. at 237; accord, Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964). But 
cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
40. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text. 
41. 340 U.S. at 317. 
42. The earlier case of Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. l (1949), where the defen-
dant's conviction was reversed on similar facts, can be distinguished because, although 
the speech was highly inflammatory, the situation was deemed more controllable. Not 
only was the address delivered in a closed auditorium so that the speaker was physi-
cally separated from his detractors, but a "cordon of policemen" was available to 
handle any disturbance that might have developed. However, see Justice Jackson's 
dissenting opinion. Id. at 13. 
43, The Court seemed to apply a curiously twisted version of the "clear and present 
danger" test. This test has undergone numerous modifications since its inception. It 
was first articulated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919), and originally applied in criminal syndicalism cases where a statute called for 
direct censorship of ideas, rather than mere regulation of the manner of expression. 
Before suppression of the expression could be justified, the danger to a substantive 
interest of the state had to be so serious and imminent that there was no time for 
words to intervene. For the subsequent development of the test, see Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 
U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Ilrandeis, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring). In the 1930's and 1940's, the Court began to apply the test to 
challenges to legislation which regulated time, place, and manner of expression rather 
than its content. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1940); Carlson 
v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 311 
(1940); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1941). The test was substantially 
reformulated, however, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), when the re-
quirement of imminency was eliminated. But see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 
(1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). For general literature on the "clear 
and present danger" test, see T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 51-53 (1966) reprinted from 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963); Antieau, Dennis v. 
United States-Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5 VAND. L. REv. 141 (1952); Lusk, 
The Present Status of the "Clear and Present Danger Test"-A. Brief History and 
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Recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that expression which 
would otherwise be protected may nevertheless be restricted if it 
has the effect of disrupting the normal functioning of the commu-
nity. 44 Although related to arousal potential, this factor is distinct 
and concerns the effect of the form of the expression rather than the 
reaction which the expression engenders. Thus, in the recent case 
of Adderley v. Florida,45 the Court affirmed the criminal trespass 
convictions of student demonstrators who had congregated on the 
premises of a county jail on the ground that the demonstration was 
disruptive of the normal functioning of that institution. In Brown v. 
Louisiana,46 which was somewhat similar in its facts to Adderly, the 
absence of disruptive activity seemed to be a decisive factor in the 
Court's reversal of several convictions for breach of the peace arising 
out of a "stand-in" conducted in a public library. The Court found 
it significant that there was no "disturbance of others, no disruption 
of library activities, and no violation of any library regulations."47 
Applying these factors to the facts in Radich, it is clear that total 
foreclosure of the defendant's expression was not justified; indeed, 
it is questionable whether even a more limited type of restriction 
woud have been permissible. The defendant did not display his 
"constructions" publicly where they might have attracted a violent 
crowd or disrupted normal community functioning. Instead, his 
exhibition took place in a private art gallery sheltered from the 
view of all but those who chose to enter. Thus, the rights of others 
to use public thoroughfares and facilities without interference was 
in no way impaired. And, given the setting in which they were pre-
Some Observations, 45 KY. L.J. 576 (1957); McKay, The Preference for Freedom, S4 
N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 1182 (1959); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to 
Dennis, 52 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 313 (1952); Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the 
Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1 (1951). 
In Feiner it seemed that the speaker was interrupted not because the ideas he was 
advocating were deemed to be imminently dangerous, but because it was feared that 
the reaction of the hostile crowd created a clear and present danger that he would be 
harmed. On the other hand, the Court did mention at one point that the speaker had 
passed the bounds of argument or persuasion and had undertaken incitement to riot. 
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951). But see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 
131, 133, n.l (1966) ("Participants in an orderly demonstration in a public place arc 
not chargeable with the danger, unprovoked except by the fact of the constitutionally 
protected demonstration itself, that their critics might react with disorder or vio-
lence."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (distinguishing Feiner). On the general problem of the "heckler's 
veto," see H. KAI.VEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140-60 (1965); Note, Free-
dom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 CoLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 1118, 1123-24 (1949); Note, Constitutional Law-Free Speech and the Hostile 
Audience, 26 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 489 (1951). 
44. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965). 
45. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
46. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
47. 383 U.S. at 142. 
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sented, the sculptures themselves probably constituted less of an 
abrupt transgression on individual sensibilities than would a similar 
display on a street corner. Since those who voluntarily enter an art 
gallery generally do so with some expectation of what they will see, 
there was less likelihood that the reaction of the onlookers would 
be violent. Nevertheless, the New York trial court in Radich was 
concerned that the "constructions" would tend to evoke a strong 
physical response and indicated that this justified total prohibition 
of the display.48 Even assuming that this fear of a violent reaction 
was justified, the court's action seems contrary to the notion that 
the state has some initial obligation to attempt to protect a speaker 
from a hostile audience prior to resorting to the alternative of sup-
pressing his expression. 49 Protecting the defendant from some out-
raged patrons in an art gallery would have been a simpler proposition 
than guarding the large groups of civil rights demonstrators in Cox 
and Edwards from belligerent whites.50 
In Street, on the other hand, the flag-burning incident occurred 
on a street corner in a large city and thus was quite likely to attract 
a crowd. Some disruption of normal community functioning was 
a probable consequence. Moreover, burning the flag in public would 
appear to be the type of inflammatory expression which would of-
fend the patriotic sensibilities of passers-by and provoke a violent 
spontaneous reaction from them. 51 Indeed, the New Yark Court of 
Appeals characterized the flag-burning as "an act of incitement, 
literally and figuratively 'incendiary' and as fraught with danger to 
the public peace as if he had stood on the street corner shouting epi-
thets at passing pedestrians."52 These factors indicate that keeping 
48. The majority in Radich cited Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 41 (1907), a case 
in which the Supreme Court upheld a similar flag desecration statute involving the 
use of the flag in advertising, and which referred to the fact that often "insults to a 
flag have been the cause of war." The New York court reasoned that the prohibited 
use of the flag in advertising is less of a "desecration," and therefore less of a threat 
to public order than the exhibition of the flag in defendant's protest art. 53 Misc. 2d 
717, 721, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680, 684-85 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1967). But see the brief discus-
sion of this point in note 11 supra. 
49. See generally Comment, The University and the Public: The Right of Access 
by Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 132, 149, n.78 (1966). 
50. Local officials have been effectively enjoined from interfering with civil rights 
and antiwar parades and rallies that would appear to have been potentially more in-
flammatory than "contemptuous" displaying of the flag in an art gallery. See, e.g., Hur-
witt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (injunction granted prohib-
iting city officials from interfering with a protest march against the Vietnam war); 
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (Selma to Montgomery march), 
discussed in Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L. REv. 785, 787-92 
(1965); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (world's fair). 
51. There was, however, no evidence in the opinion of any violent reaction. 
52. 20 N.Y.2d 231, 237, 229 N.E.2d 187, 191, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491, 496 (1967), appeal 
filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1967) (No. 688). Compare Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where the Supreme Court acknowledged that insulting 
epithets, which by their very utterance tend to inflict injury or incite to an immediate 
breach of the peace, may be prevented and punished in order to preserve public order. 
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the peace might have been impossible. Therefore, although Street's 
expression was protected by the free speech guaranty, the state might 
have been justified in subjecting it to reasonable restrictions neces-
sary to preserve order in the community. However, the court's appli-
cation of the New York statute completely to foreclose the expression 
was improper. At best, "reasonableness" would seem to justify only 
statutory limitations as to the "time, place and manner"63 of the 
expression. By this analysis the defendant's conviction should have 
been upheld only if the state had properly enacted a statute regulat-
ing the time and place of expression and the defendant had failed to 
abide by the requirements of that statute. 04 
The remaining question is whether the preceding analysis must 
be modified because the expressions in Radich and Street involved 
the use of symbols having a special significance. Any such modifi-
cation must be based on the notion that the state has an independent 
interest in promoting patriotism which justifies preventing dese-
cration of "sacred" national symbols.55 
This concept is not novel56 and does not depend upon the effect 
that this form of expression has on public order. The idea that 
coerced national unity in matters of politics and religion is essential 
to the security of the state has resulted in restrictions on freedom 
of expression for centuries. Heresy and blasphemy were punishable 
offenses against the established church, and later seditious libel be-
came the analogous crime against the state.57 Even recently, it has 
been customary for national and local leaders to compel people to 
engage in appropriate gestures of respect for national emblems.68 
And, as to religious symbols, it would be erroneous to assume that 
state coercion of respect for religious ideals was confined to the 
Middle Ages. State blasphemy statutes, which deemed contempt, 
indignity, or irreverence toward God to be criminally libelous, were 
enforced in a number of American jurisdictions as late as the first 
quarter of this century. 59 
53. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941): 
If a municipality has authority to control the use of its public streets for parades 
or processions, as it undoubtedly has, it cannot be denied authority to give con-
sideration, without unfair discrimination, to time, place and manner in relation 
to the other proper uses of the street. 
54. Id. 
55. For an expression of this view, see Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586, 595 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1943). 
56. Indeed, the deification of a symbol or "totem," the desecration of which meant 
banishment from the tribe, is the oldest form of religious belief. See G. THOMSON, 
AEsCHYLUS AND ATHENS 1-2 (1966). 
57. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 164 (1960). 
58. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
59. See Maine v. Mockus, 113 A. 39 (Me. 1921), 14 A.L.R. 871 (1921). See also 
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838); People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 
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Today, however, such attempts to legislate religious orthodoxy 
would raise serious questions under the first amendment prohibition 
of laws "respecting an establishment of religion."60 The Supreme 
Court has struck down a New York statute permitting the censor-
ship of "sacrilegious" movies.61 New York's highest court had inter-
preted the law to mean "that no religion, as that word is understood 
by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, 
mockery, scorn and ridicule .... "62 The Supreme Court replied 
that "[a]pplication of the 'sacrilegious' test, in these or other respects, 
might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's 
guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for 
all."63 With regard to freedom of expression, the Court pointed out 
that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all 
religions from the expression of views distasteful to the-m. 64 There-
fore, it would seem that the first amendment prevents a state from 
coercing respect for "sacred" religious symbols by imposing criminal 
sanctions against their abuse or "desecration."65 
However, different standards occasionally seem to have been 
applied to permit the government to restrict desecration of its own 
symbols of authority. The result in a recent case involving draft-
card burning as a form of protest seems to be a manifestation of this 
notion. Although the draft card is not a "sacred" national symbol, 
it has become a symbol of governmental authority and is now asso-
ciated with patriotism in the public mind. In United States v. 
Miller,66 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the 
290 (N.Y. 1811). Under such statutes, the defendant's disrespectful display of the cross 
in Radich would certainly have been punishable. 
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
61. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
62. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N.Y. 242, 258, 101 N.E.2d 665, 672 (1951) 
(emphasis added). At another point, the New York Court of Appeals defined the term 
"sacrilegious" to mean "the act of violating or profaning anything sacred." Id. at 255, 
101 N.E.2d at 670. 
63. 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952). For an extended discussion of the concept of sacrilege 
see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion. Id. at 507. 
64. 343 U.S. at 505; accord, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), in 
which the Court reversed the breach of the peace conviction of a member of Jehovah's 
Witnesses who had attacked all organized religions as instruments of Satan and caste• 
gated the Catholic Church in such vehement terms as to offend the religious sensibili-
ties of his audience. The Court recognized that: 
[I]n the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences 
arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his 
neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader ••• at times 
resorts to e.xaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent 
in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have 
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and 
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and 
right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy. 
65. Of course, this does not mean that the state is powerless to prevent harmful 
conduct. Thus, if a man defaces the altar of a church or destroys a crucifix, such 
conduct is punishable as destruction of private property. 
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recent amendment to the Selective Service Act making it a federal 
crime knowingly to mutilate a draft card.67 Although arguably this 
amendment was aimed at stifling this particular mode of political 
dissent, the Second Circuit maintained that it merely strengthened 
the existing provisions of the law requiring continuous possession 
of the draft certificate. 68 Even assuming that the legitimate national 
interest in the orderly operation of a conscription system does in 
fact justify requiring registrants to be in continuous possession of 
their draft cards69 despite the fact that this may result in an indirect 
restraint on freedom of expression, it is difficult to discern what 
purpose is served by the additional provision making it a separate 
offense knowingly to effect the loss of possession by destruction or 
mutilation.70 The most probable explanation of such a provision is 
that it was intended to prevent public displays of disrespect for this 
particular symbol of national authority. 
The latter interpretation was adopted by the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit in O'Brien v. United States,71 a case factually 
similar to Miller, when it decided that the Selective Service amend-
ment was directed at those who choose to portray graphically their 
disagreement with government policy and was therefore unconsti-
tutional. The court stated that to conclude that the "impact of such 
conduct would impede the war effort, and measure the sentence by 
the nature of his communication, would be to punish defendant, 
pro tanto, for exactly what the First Amendment protects."72 Thus, 
the court apparently refused to modify the well-established consti-
tutional limitations upon restraint of free speech simply because a 
national symbol was involved.73 
However, in its recent decision in the O'Brien case, the Supreme 
Court rejected the First Circuit's interpretation and upheld the con-
sti~utionality of the Selective Service amendment.74 While denying 
that an "apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 
'speech' " simply because the actor intends thereby to communicate 
an idea, the Court found that even if the form of expression used is 
subject to first amendment protection, the action may nonetheless 
be regulable. 75 Thus, since " 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are 
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important gov-
66. 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967). 
67. 50 app. U.S.C. § 462(b){3) (Supp. I, 1965) as amended, 79 Stat. 586 (1965). 
68. 367 F .2d at 77. 
69. See 367 F.2d at 77 for a discussion of this assumption. 
70. But see O'Brien v. United States, 36 U.S.L.W. 4469, 4473 (U.S. May 27, 1968). 
71. 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 814 (1967) (No. 232). 
72. 376 F .2d at 542. 
73. The court nonetheless found no constitutional objection to defendant's convic-
tion for intentional nonpossession of his draft card under unamended statute. 376 F.2d 
at 541. 
74. O'Brien v. United States, 36 U.S.L.W. 4469 (U.S. May 27, 1968). 
75. 36 U.S.L.W. at 4472. 
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ernmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."76 The Court 
posited that the constitutional power to raise and support armies 
justified the requirement of continuous possession of the draft certif-
icate. But, unless it is assumed that burning a draft card is likely 
to interrupt the normal functioning of the community or arouse such 
a violent response that it could not be controlled by law enforcement 
officials, it would seem that there is no constitutional justification for 
total foreclosure of draft card burning under a statute prohibiting 
mutilation. Although the Court indicated that a "sizeable crowd" 
attacked O'Brien after he burned his draft card,77 it apparently did 
not rely upon this fact in reaching its decision, nor did it consider the 
factors of controllability and normal community functioning. Perhaps 
the decision is best explained by the presence of a symbol of govern-
mental authority in the case. 
The flag desecration statute under which Radich and Street were 
convicted78 is another example of the idea that protection of im-
portant national symbols may justify relaxation of constitutional 
protections otherwise applicable. There are several additional argu-
ments which can be levelled at this statute. Due process requires 
that criminal statutes contain predictable indicia of guilt so as to 
provide fair notice of the acts punishable thereunder.79 Further-
more, the Supreme Court has indicated that the requisite standard 
of clarity will be particularly high if a statute may deter freedom of 
expression.80 It would seem that such terms as "defile," "defy," and 
76. 36 U.S.L."W. at 4472. 
77. 36 U.S.L.W. at 4469-70. 
78. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
79. See generally Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 
382 U.S. 399 (1965); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); United States v. Cardiff, 
344 U.S. 174 (1952); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Lanzetta v. 
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Compare the following cases in which statutory lan-
guage was held to be sufficiently definite: Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); 
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); United States v. Petrillo, 
332 U.S. 1 (1947); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); see generally Note, The 
Yoid-for-Yagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 67 (1960). 
80. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959): 
[T)his Court has intimated that stricter standards of permissible statutory vague-
ness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; 
a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemi-
nation of ideas may be the loser. 
The danger of vagueness in an area as "delicate alld vulnerable" as first amendment 
freedoms does not depend so much upon the absence of fair notice to the accused as 
upon the existence of criminal statutes capable of sweeping unnecessarily broadly into 
the area of protected rights where "the threat of sanctions may deter their exercise 
almost as potently as the actual application of the sanctions" themselves. NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Win-
ters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965), a Louisiana statute making it a crime 
to congregate with others with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace or under 
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"cast contempt upon" fall short of this standard. What is contemp-
tuous to one man may be a work of art to another.81 Thus, given the 
high degree of subjectivity of judgments on the meaning of such 
terms, it is difficult to see how the terms used in the New York flag 
desecration statute establish any meaningful standards of guilt. 
In addition to the lack of notice provided by such terms, their 
breadth can have another kind of adverse effect on freedom of speech. 
Since the terms are broad enough to encompass logically many kinds 
of conduct, the statute provides local officials with an opportunity 
to impose their own standards of political orthodoxy on the com-
munity.82 Indeed, Radich may well illustrate this point. Under a 
broad interpretation of the New York statute, the flag is being "dese-
crated" every day by its use in advertising, on clothing, and in a 
variety of other ways.83 However, in these instances enforcement of 
the statute is almost totally lacking. Ironically, the characteristic 
which distinguishes Radich's use of the flag from those which go 
unchallenged is that he attempted to express a political grievance. 
It would be diconcerting to find that the Constitution permits 
political expression to be stifled merely because it employs a "sacred" 
symbol and thereby offends the patriotic sensibilities of those in 
power. The Supreme Court seemed to reject the notion of a pre-
ferred position for sacred national symbols in West Virginia Board 
such circumstances that a breach of the peace may occur was held unconstitutionally 
vague and indefinite in its overly-broad scope since it permitted punishment for 
peaceful expression or unpopular views. See also Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 
195 (1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary, 378 U.S. 
500 (1964). 
81. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). It would seem that the con-
cept of "desecration" is incapable of precise definition, particularly when what is 
sacred to one man may seem to be the "rankest error" to his neighbor. Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). 
82. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-57 (1965), an ordinance forbidding ob-
struction of public passageways was invalidated, not because the state may not justi-
fiably regulate conduct with indirect expressive effects, but because its overly-broad 
provisions permitted discriminatory application in the complete discretion of local 
officials. 
Indeed, several commentators have suggested that the purpose of the federal flag 
desecration statute recently passed by the House of Representatives (H.R. 271, which 
passed by a vote of 385-16, specifies: "Whoever casts contempt upon any flag of the 
United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, or trampling upon it shall 
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.) is 
to eliminate this vivid form of opposition to the Vietnam war. See, Hearings on H.R. 
271 Before Subcom. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 
ser. 4 (1967). 
83. LIFE, March 31, 1967, at 18-25. The article vividly portrays the use of the Amer-
ican flag on all kinds of merchandise, advertising, fashions, and stage dress. Among the 
commercial items adorned with the flag are clothing, handkerchiefs, linens, towels, the-
atrical garb, and martini olives. It would seem that, technically, each of these uses is 
in violation of the New York flag desecration law and similar statutes in other states. 
Also depicted is the frequent use of the flag in works of "hippy" art. 
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of Education v. Barnette.84 In that case, it was argued that a compul-
sory flag salute was a permissible means of securing national unity. 
The Court assumed that officials could pursue national unity by 
persuasion and example,85 but it held that compulsory affirmation 
of belief in a patriotic creed was contrary to the first amendment. 
Implicit in this holding is the idea that the mere presence of a 
sacred symbol does not justify altering the standard to be employed 
in determining the validity of state restrictions which have a repres-
sive effect on freedom of expression. The Court's concluding lan-
guage is particularly relevant: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in pol-
itics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith therein.86 
The Court emphasized that "there is no mysticism in the American 
concept of the State" or in the nature of its authority.87 Thus, in 
the absence of an imminent threat to the peace of the community, 
the state should not be permitted to impose restrictions on political 
expressions which take the form of disrespect for "sacred" national 
symbols.88 
84. 1119 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 
(1940); cf. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). 
85. 319 U.S. at 640. 
86. 319 U.S. at 642. Consider also the following language from the Court's opinion: 
"[F]reedom to differ is not limited to the things that do not matter much. That would 
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to 
things that touch the heart of the existing order." 319 U.S. at 642. 
87. 319 U.S. at 641. This statement should dispel the notion that the flag and other 
symbols of nationalism are somehow absolute and above the everyday exigencies of 
politics. 
88. Of course, this does not mean that the state is powerless to regulate conduct 
for a proper purpose. Thus, if a man defaces a national monument or throws a rock 
through a Supreme Court window, his conduct may be punished although he might 
contend that his behavior was a form of "symbolic expression." And certainly no one 
would suggest that political assassination is a permissible form of "symbolic" protest. 
However, apart from such overt threats to public order, the state's legitimate interest 
in promoting patriotism is insufficient by itself to justify suppression of expressive be-
havior merely because it is disrespectful of sacred national symbols. This principle 
would apply whether a person displays the flag in works of protest art, sings words of 
dissent to the tune of the National Anthem, or burns a copy of the Declaration of 
Independence on the Fourth of July. 
